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FREE, BUT STILL BEHIND BARS: READING 
THE ILLINOIS POST-CONVICTION 
HEARING ACT TO ALLOW ANY PERSON 
CONVICTED OF A CRIME TO RAISE A 
CLAIM OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE 
HUGH M. MUNDY* 
Abstract: As the number of wrongfully convicted prisoners who are subsequent-
ly exonerated continues to rise, the importance of access to post-conviction relief 
also increases. Under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, this access is re-
stricted to petitioners who are currently imprisoned or otherwise facing a restraint 
on their liberty. Persons convicted of a crime who have completed their sentence 
are barred from pursuing post-conviction relief under the Act, regardless of the 
existence of exculpatory evidence that supports their innocence. Removing this 
procedural roadblock and interpreting the Act broadly to allow any person con-
victed of a crime to raise a claim of actual innocence is necessary to ensure that 
the wrongfully convicted can, eventually, have justice. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, eighty-seven wrongfully convicted prisoners in the United States 
were exonerated, “the highest number since researchers began keeping track 
more than 20 years ago.”1 Contrary to popular perception, exculpatory DNA 
evidence is no longer the driving force in innocence cases, accounting for only 
one-fifth of exonerations.2 In fact, biological evidence is unavailable in the 
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author also wishes to acknowledge The John Marshall Law School Pro Bono Clinic, Katie Anderson, 
Leighten Hendrickson, Jillian Kassel, Alex McDonald, Meghan Tribe, and his family for their invalu-
able research, support, and contributions. 
 1 Laura Sullivan, Exonerations on the Rise, and Not Just Because of DNA, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Feb. 4, 2014, 3:47 AM), available at http://www.npr.org/2014/02/04/271120630/exonerations-on-
the-rise-and-not-just-because-of-dna, archived at http://perma.cc/3D7W-RN5B; see also Timothy 
Williams, Study Puts Exonerations at Record Level in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2014, at A12. 
 2 Duaa Eldeib & Steve Mills, 3 Get Certificates of Innocence After Murder Convictions Dis-
missed, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2014, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-23/news/
chi-3-get-certificates-of-innocence-after-murder-convictions-dismissed-20140123_1_deon-patrick-
jeffrey-lassiter-sharon-haugabook, archived at http://perma.cc/K7E2-9JDW (stating that recent cases 
“suggest that the era of DNA exonerations may be nearing an end; . . . [a]s a result, future exoneration 
attempts likely will come in cases that do not have DNA”); Sullivan, supra note 1. 
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:1 
majority of cases.3 The lack of DNA is especially commonplace in older cases, 
where police departments were not required to collect and preserve biological 
evidence.4 Consequently, potentially exculpatory DNA was lost, destroyed, or 
degraded.5 The majority of states, including Illinois, have since recognized the 
critical importance of obtaining biological evidence for both the prosecution 
and defense of criminal cases and the preservation of this evidence after trial.6 
Without DNA, time-consuming, costly, and resource-intensive investiga-
tion is necessary to uncover other evidence of innocence.7 Investigators must, 
at once, retrace the steps taken in the initial investigation while also searching 
for new or previously undiscovered evidence.8 Of course, most prisoners can-
not access the resources, and do not have the ability on their own, to build a 
case for innocence.9 Instead, innocence investigations often depend on a will-
                                                                                                                           
 3 Glenn A. Garber & Angharad Vaughan, Actual-Innocence Policy, Non-DNA Innocence Claims, 
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 2008, at 1 (“[F]or every DNA exoneree there are hundreds if not over a thousand 
wrongfully convicted defendants whose cases do not contain biological evidence that could prove 
innocence.”); Daniel S. Medwed, California Dreaming? The Golden State’s Restless Approach to 
Newly Discovered Evidence of Innocence, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007) (“[O]nly an 
estimated ten to twenty percent of criminal cases in the United States have any biological evidence 
suitable for DNA testing.”). 
 4 See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Dis-
covered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 656–57 (2005). 
 5 Id. 
 6 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 7928, THE BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE PRESERVA-
TION HANDBOOK: BEST PRACTICES FOR EVIDENCE HANDLERS (2013), available at http://nvlpubs.
nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7928.pdf; BRITTANY ERICKSEN & ILSE KNECHT, THE NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, EVIDENCE RETENTION LAWS: A STATE-BY-STATE COMPARISON 2–
12 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/U4YH-XE6S. Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia 
require the preservation of evidence after trial, although the statutes vary in terms of the length of time 
for which evidence must be preserved, the kinds of evidence that must be preserved, and the types of 
crimes for which evidence must be preserved. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra; ERICK-
SEN & KNECHT, supra; see, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-4(e) (2012) (requiring the post-
conviction preservation of “blood, hair, saliva, or semen”). Eight states only require the preservation 
of evidence once the state has received a post-conviction request for DNA testing. ALA. CODE § 15-
18-200(d) (2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-7-14 (LexisNexis 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 
(2013); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-5 (2014); TENN. CODE. 
ANN. § 40-30-309 (2012); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 78B-9-301 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-304 
(2013). Washington gives sentencing courts authority to order the preservation of evidence in a felony 
case, either upon motion of the defendant or at the discretion of the court. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. 
§ 10.73.170 (West Supp. 2012). Seven states do not have any statutes requiring the preservation of 
evidence after trial. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra; ERICKSEN & KNECHT, supra. 
 7 See Medwed, supra note 3, at 1440 (such evidence may include “recantations by trial witnesses, 
disclosures by previously unknown witnesses, or confessions by the true perpetrator”). In many cases, 
counsel must perform their own investigation and shoulder the responsibilities of tracking down trial 
witnesses and finding the true perpetrator. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 4, at 663.  
 8 See Medwed, supra note 4 at 658–59; see also Eldeib & Mills, supra note 2 (quoting Rob War-
den, executive director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions, about non-DNA exonerations 
(“[T]hey’re hard. You’ve got to go back and you really have to reinvestigate the entire case . . . . It’s 
not just a DNA test.”)). 
 9 Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALA. L. REV. 1157, 1200 (2010). 
2015] Illinois Post-Conviction Act Allows Claims of Actual Innocence 3 
ingness by police departments and prosecutors to revisit closed cases.10 While 
the creation of “conviction integrity units” in New York, Chicago, and several 
other cities reflect recent efforts to respond to the “sharp, cold shower” brought 
about by DNA-driven exonerations, prosecutors are still slow to reopen inves-
tigations—much less admit error in their own cases.11 As a result, wrongfully 
convicted prisoners whose cases lack the lottery-winning odds of exculpatory 
DNA evidence may be left to rely on the equally remote chance that a prosecu-
tor or law enforcement officer will take interest in their case. 
Absent prosecutorial benevolence, a convicted prisoner’s best chance to 
pursue claims of innocence is typically to appeal the conviction in state court.12 
Even the state process, however, presents significant hurdles, especially for 
indigent post-conviction petitioners.13 In Illinois, a claim of actual innocence 
must be based on “newly discovered evidence” that is “material to the issue 
and not merely cumulative of other trial evidence” and “of such conclusive 
character that it would probably change the result on retrial.”14 Though the 
new evidence is not required to categorically prove a petitioner’s innocence, it 
must establish “that all of the facts and surrounding circumstances” of the trial 
and verdict “should be scrutinized more closely . . . .”15 To compound the 
struggle, petitioners are not constitutionally entitled to counsel on post-
conviction appeal.16 Around the country, demand for representation through 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Sullivan, supra note 1; see Williams, supra note 1 (“Fewer exonerations than in the past in-
volved DNA evidence, a circumstance [the National Registry of Exonerations] attributed to the police 
and prosecutors exhibiting greater concern about the problem of false convictions.”). 
 11 Sullivan, supra note 1 (quoting Samuel Gross, a University of Michigan law professor who 
tracks exonerations, as saying that “[t]he sharp, cold shower that DNA gave to the criminal justice 
system . . . was a serious wake-up call, because that showed we made mistakes in a lot of cases where 
it never occurred to anybody that a mistake had been made”); see Vivian Yee, As Two Go Free, 
Brooklyn Conviction Challenges Keep Pouring In, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2014, at A18. 
 12 ANDREA D. LYON ET AL., ILL. STATE BAR ASSOC., POST-CONVICTION PRACTICE: A MANUAL 
FOR ILLINOIS ATTORNEYS 19–20, 20 n.17 (2012) (“[F]or [a petitioner] to succeed on an actual inno-
cence claim, it must happen in state court if it is going to happen at all,” except in “very limited cir-
cumstances” in which federal habeas relief may be available.). A federal petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus that advances a “substantial claim of actual innocence [is] extremely rare.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 
U.S. 298, 321 (1995). While a claim of innocence may be raised in federal habeas proceedings, it 
cannot provide an independent or “freestanding” basis for relief. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 
(2006). Rather, a meritorious innocence claim functions only as a “gateway” to allow a petitioner to 
raise otherwise defaulted constitutional claims. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316; Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
390, 404 (1993); Kathleen Callahan, Note, In Limbo: In Re Davis and the Future of Herrera Inno-
cence Claims in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 633 (2011) (describing litigation 
of actual innocence claims in federal habeas proceedings as a “complicated process”). 
 13 People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 947–48 (Ill. 2009).  
 14 Id. at 949–50 (quoting People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 15 Id. at 952 (quoting People v. Molstad, 461 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ill. 1984)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 16 See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974). In Illinois, a court may appoint counsel 
to represent an indigent defendant only if the court first determines that the constitutional claims 
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Innocence Projects—legal aid offices that represent individuals pursuing exon-
eration—far outpaces available resources.17 As a result, only a fortunate few 
benefit from counsel to investigate claims of innocence or otherwise “navigate 
the post-conviction labyrinth . . . .”18 
As an additional impediment, Illinois restricts access to post-conviction 
relief to petitioners who are “imprisoned in the penitentiary.”19 This limitation 
puts wrongfully convicted—though physically free—individuals in a kind of 
post-conviction purgatory, where they are more capable than an imprisoned 
petitioner of uncovering new evidence of innocence, but subsequently barred 
from presenting the evidence in a post-conviction petition.20 In this Article, I 
will explore the impact of the Illinois “imprisonment” restriction on post-
conviction review by examining the case of Maurice Dunn. In addition, I will 
discuss the history of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the emergence 
of actual innocence claims as a basis for relief under the Act, and the origin of 
limitations on access to relief for petitioners who have served a sentence of 
imprisonment. Finally, I will propose an interpretation of the Act, steeped in 
due process and anchored in recent amendments to the law, to allow for any 
person convicted of a crime to pursue a claim of actual innocence. 
                                                                                                                           
raised in a pro se post-conviction petition have merit. People v. Watson, 719 N.E.2d 719, 720 (Ill. 
1999). According to the Illinois post-conviction statute, counsel shall be appointed if the petitioner is 
under a sentence of death, indigent, and requests the court appoint him or her counsel. 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (2012). Illinois, however, abolished the death penalty in 2011. John Schwartz & 
Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Illinois Governor Signs Capital Punishment Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, 
at A18. 
 17 See E-mail from Alexander Simpson, Assoc. Dir., Cal. Innocence Project to author (Sep. 26, 
2014) (on file with author). For instance, the California Innocence Project (“CIP”) receives between 
1800 and 2000 requests for legal representation annually and, with the support of students who screen 
the cases, narrows this number to around one hundred cases. Id. CIP has approximately forty active 
cases, where some form of representation is being provided, at any given time. Id.  
 18 Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Has Endangered 
Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus and What the Supreme Court Can Do in Maples and Martinez to 
Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 186 (2011) (offering a due process rationale for the right to 
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings). 
 19 § 122-1(a) (“[a]ny person imprisoned in the penitentiary”). Although beyond the scope of this 
article, a further limitation on post-conviction review of actual innocence claims is the demanding 
standard of review in Illinois for leave of court to file successive petitions. For an in-depth discussion 
of that standard, see Vanessa J. Szalapski, Note, Losing Our Innocence: The Illinois Successive Post-
Conviction Actual Innocence Petition Standard After People v. Edwards, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 195, 200–03 (2014). 
 20 § 2-1401. Under very limited circumstances, a civil motion for Relief from judgment may offer 
another route for the presentation of newly discovered evidence of innocence. Id. Under this statute, a 
civil motion for Relief from judgment must be filed within two years of the entry of the judgment, 
unless the petitioner was “under legal disability or duress or the ground for relief [was] fraudulently 
concealed . . . .” Id. While claims of innocence may be raised under 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401, 
such claims must comport with the statute of limitations. See, e.g., People v. McDonald, 937 N.E.2d 
778, 784–85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (affirming dismissal of motion for relief from judgment raising inno-
cence claims for failure to timely file motion or advance colorable claim under fraudulent conceal-
ment exception). 
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I. “HONESTLY, THE PERSON IS STILL OUT THERE” 21—POST-CONVICTION 
AND THE CASE OF MAURICE DUNN 
The case of Maurice Dunn illustrates the struggle of indigent prisoners to 
discover new evidence of innocence and highlights the need for enlarged ac-
cess to post-conviction relief. On September 25, 1980, Dunn was convicted of 
raping Constance Dourdy, despite flaws in the police department’s investiga-
tion and many inconsistencies in the testimony of eyewitnesses.22 A recent in-
vestigation by The John Marshall Law School Pro Bono Clinic uncovered 
these many discrepancies, as well as potentially exculpatory evidence.23 Be-
cause Dunn fully served his sentence and has since been released, he is no 
longer eligible to seek post-conviction relief from the state of Illinois or at-
tempt to clear his name.24 
The initial connections between Dunn and the rape of Constance Dourdy 
were tenuous at best. Dourdy was sexually assaulted on July 30, 1979 at ap-
proximately 7:45 AM while walking to a commuter train station in the Beverly 
neighborhood of Chicago.25 Less than a day later, Dunn was identified as the 
primary suspect.26 He and his wife, Willa, lived in Harvey, about fifteen miles 
from the site of the attack, and the teenage couple was expecting their first 
child.27 Dunn could not find steady employment.28 As a consequence, Willa 
moved to her parents’ home in Beverly.29 The home was a short distance from 
the area of Dourdy’s assault, but it was separated by two fences, dense shrub-
bery, and railroad tracks.30 Dunn visited Willa frequently, and he had no run-
ins with the police while Willa lived in Beverly.31 
At a pretrial hearing after Dunn’s arrest for the rape, a police officer’s tes-
timony overstated Dunn’s prior criminal history. Before his arrest in the 
Dourdy case, Dunn had never been accused of a sexual assault.32 He had a sin-
                                                                                                                           
 21 Brief and Argument for the Petitioner at D.8, Dunn v. Pierce, No. 90256 (filed Feb. 6, 2001 
with Supreme Court of Illinois) (“I would like to say to Mrs. Dourdy that as my God is my witness I 
think there’s some mistake in your identity . . . . Honestly, the person is still out there.”).  
 22 See Transcript of Record at 321, People v. Dunn, (Ill. Crim. Ct. Sept. 23, 1980) (No. 79-CR-
4915) [hereinafter Second Trial Transcript].  
 23 See, e.g., Affidavit of Jillian Kassel at 2, People v. Dunn, (Ill. Crim. Ct.) (No. 79-CR-4915) (on 
file with author).   
 24 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(a) (2012).  
 25 Transcript of Record at 215–16, People v. Dunn, (Ill. Crim. Ct. May 7, 1980) (No. 79-CR-
4915) [hereinafter Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript].  
 26 Id. at 23–24.  
 27 Id. at 199–201. 
 28 Id. at 200. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 36–38. 
 31 See Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 200. 
 32 Id. at 208. 
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gle prior felony conviction: a 1977 robbery, for which he received probation.33 
At the pretrial hearing, a police officer testified that six months earlier Dunn 
had been suspected of “purse snatchings” near the Rock Island commuter train 
station.34 The officer did not support his claim against Dunn with documenta-
tion.35 Rather, he obliquely referred only to the department’s interest in a “male 
subject,” and claimed that they did not question Dunn at the time because they 
could not locate him, despite the fact that Dunn’s prior arrest record listed both 
his Harvey address and his in-laws’ Beverly home.36 
At the same pretrial hearing, another officer testified that he received a 
copy of a police report containing Dourdy’s description of her attacker.37 Pre-
pared hours after the assault, the report was created to help officers pinpoint a 
suspect.38 Dourdy’s description was “sketchy” and not complete.39 She could 
not provide any facial description of the suspect.40 Rather, she described her 
attacker in broad generalities: black, “five foot four to five foot seven,” “medi-
um build,” “short hair,” and “[t]wenty-three to thirty” years old.41 Dourdy also 
said that her assailant wore a “jogging suit” and gym shoes.42 
Although the officer confirmed through police department records that, 
contrary to the description of Dourdy’s attacker, Dunn stood approximately 
five-foot-nine and was nineteen years old, Chicago police contacted their Har-
vey counterparts with instructions to locate and arrest him.43 This time, alt-
hough armed only with the same addresses previously available to the depart-
ment, the police apprehended Dunn at his Harvey home approximately two 
hours later. 44 
Even when viewed in a favorable light, the evidence gathered by the po-
lice did not point to Dunn as the likely culprit. All the police learned through 
their brief investigation was that Dunn was a black teenager with a prior crimi-
nal conviction, had a tenuous connection to Beverly, and was loosely suspected 
of a series of purse snatchings half-a-year earlier.45 Moreover, police records 
indicated that Dunn’s height and age fell outside the broad range in Dourdy’s 
description. Nonetheless, the evidence, bolstered by the police department’s 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Id. at 230–31. 
 34 Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 44.  
 35 Id. at 45–47.  
 36 Id. at 44–45. 
 37 Id. at 28–29. 
 38 Id. at 23. 
 39 Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 144. 
 40 Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 208. 
 41 Id. at 29–31, 212. 
 42 Id. at 186. 
 43 Id. at 10, 29–30. 
 44 Id. at 9–11. 
 45 See id. at 44; Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 230–31. 
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desire to make a quick arrest in the violent attack, was enough for police to end 
their search and tab Dunn as the culprit. 
On July 31, 1979 at 1:00 AM, Dourdy was called to a Chicago police pre-
cinct to view a lineup.46 The police alerted her to the presence of “a suspect” in 
the lineup.47 Of the five individuals presented together in the lineup, only 
Dunn wore jogging clothes, including shorts and gym shoes.48 The other indi-
viduals wore street clothing; only one other man wore gym shoes.49 Dunn was 
only one of two men with short hair.50 Dourdy identified Dunn.51 
Susan Kelly, a neighborhood resident who walked past a man on the 
morning of the attack who said “something obscene” to her, also viewed the 
lineup.52 Kelly described to the police a man with “short” hair wearing a “jog-
ging shirt . . . .”53 Even though the police told Kelly the suspect was present, 
she could not positively identify anyone in the lineup.54 
Beverly Monks, who resided in the vicinity of the assault, also viewed the 
lineup.55 Sometime after the assault, Monks saw from her second-floor win-
dow a suspicious-looking man run past her driveway and behind her home.56 
Like Kelly, Monks could not positively identify any individual in the lineup.57 
Nevertheless, based on Dourdy’s identification of Dunn, he was formally 
charged with rape and aggravated battery.58 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 199.  
 47 Id. at 200. 
 48 Lineup Photograph (on file with author). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 213. 
 52 Id. at 68, 71. 
 53 Id. at 70. 
 54 Id. at 59, 71. 
 55 Id. at 188. 
 56 Transcript of Record at 604, People v. Dunn, (Ill. Crim. Ct. May 14, 1980) (No. 79-CR-4915) 
[hereinafter First Trial Transcript].  
 57 Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 183–84. While Monks did not testify at the pre-
trial hearing, two police officers who conducted the lineup, Charles McCorkle and Joanne Ryan, both 
testified. Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 55, 181. Neither officer stated affirmatively 
that Monks identified Dunn. Id. at 59, 188. Further, at the first trial, Monks admitted that she “never 
saw the front” of the individual who ran past her window and “was looking at the back of him.” First 
Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 615. 
 58 First Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 480. A motion to suppress Dunn’s arrest led to unin-
tended consequences regarding the lineup. Id. Barry Spector argued that Harvey Police arrested Dunn 
without probable cause and the subsequent identifications, both out-of-court and in-court, should be 
suppressed. Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 2. In renewing this motion after the first 
trial ended in a mistrial, Spector hoped to quash the lineup as a fruit of the unlawful arrest and prevent 
Dourdy’s in-court identification of Dunn. First Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 962. The court 
granted the motion, but then ruled that the lineup was not unreasonably suggestive and that Dourdy’s 
claim as to the number of times she saw her attacker provided an independent basis for her identifica-
tion (“seven or three opportunities, or whatever, for five seconds is much more than ample”). First 
Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 972. The court’s ruling effectively allowed the case to proceed. See 
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New lineup standards in Illinois highlight several fundamental flaws in 
Dunn’s lineup.59 First, the officer administering the lineup knew Dunn was the 
suspect and alerted Dourdy, Kelly, and Monks to his presence.60 Illinois now 
requires that eyewitnesses viewing a lineup sign a form stating that “[t]he sus-
pect might not be in the lineup,” that “the eyewitness is not obligated to make 
an identification,” and that “[t]he eyewitness should not assume that the person 
administering the lineup . . . knows which person is the suspect . . . .”61 The 
new standards also call for the use of double-blind administration, in which 
neither the officer nor the witness knows if the suspect is in the lineup.62 Fur-
ther, the lineup was administered simultaneously; in other words, all five indi-
viduals were presented at once.63 The 2003 standards endorsed a pilot study on 
the use of “[s]equential lineup procedures,” in which one individual at a time is 
shown to the eyewitness, to further the “goal of a police investigation . . . to 
apprehend the person or persons responsible for committing a crime . . . .”64 In 
addition, Dourdy was not asked to provide a confidence statement following 
her identification of Dunn.65 Current Illinois standards require that the witness 
“state in his or her own words how sure he or she is that the person identified 
is the actual offender” after viewing a sequential lineup.66 Most critically, the 
selection of “fillers,” or other lineup members, proved extraordinarily prejudi-
cial in Maurice Dunn’s case.67 Dunn was conspicuous in his attire, complexion, 
build, facial features, and age.68 Illinois now forbids such suggestive practic-
es.69 
                                                                                                                           
id. For Dunn, the successful motion was more a curse than a blessing. See Second Trial Transcript, 
supra note 22, at 319–20. The retrial jury heard Dourdy’s in-court identification but never received 
evidence regarding the investigation or lineup. See id. at 60, 319–20. The jurors’ interest in both 
events was clear. See id. at 319. During deliberations, they asked, “When and where did [Dourdy] 
positively identify [Dunn]?” Id. The jury also inquired about the reasons behind Dunn’s arrest. Id. The 
court instructed the jury to “[g]o back and deliberate” rather than “speculate.” Id. at 320. In effect, the 
jurors were left without a clue about the porous police investigation and flawed lineup that led to 
Dunn’s prosecution. See id. at 319–20. 
 59 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-5 (2012). In 2003, the Illinois legislature enacted new stand-
ards for lineups intended to stem the tide of wrongful convictions, and conducted a pilot study “on the 
effectiveness of the sequential method for lineup procedures.” Id. § 107A-10(a). These pilot programs 
have subsequently been expanded and made permanent through new legislation. Id. 
 60 See Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 59, 61, 63, 200.  
 61 § 107A-5(b)(1), (b)(2).  
 62 See §§ 107A-5(b)(1)–(b)(2),10(c)(2). 
 63 See Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 59, 192, 209–10; Lineup Photograph (on 
file with author). 
 64 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-10(a), (c) (2012). 
 65 See Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 193, 213. 
 66 § 107A-10(c)(3)(C). 
 67 See § 107A-5(c); Lineup Photograph (on file with author).  
 68 Lineup Photograph (on file with author). 
 69 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-5(c) (2012). Under Illinois law, “[s]uspects in a lineup or photo 
spread should not appear to be substantially different from ‘fillers’ or ‘distracters’ in the lineup or 
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After Dunn’s first trial ended in May 1980 with the jury deadlocked, he 
was retried in September 1980, over a year after the assault took place.70 Dunn 
was represented by O. Kenneth Thomas at his second trial, a civil lawyer who 
filed an appearance eleven days before the trial began.71 Citing his lack of 
preparation and his competing obligations in an ongoing real estate matter, 
Thomas filed a motion to continue just three days before the retrial.72 The 
court failed to rule on the motion and the retrial proceeded as scheduled.73 
Thomas’s inability to effectively represent Dunn at the retrial quickly be-
came apparent. Dunn’s lawyer at the first trial, Barry Spector, spoke with 
Thomas in the days before the retrial.74 In a post-conviction affidavit, Spector 
described Thomas as “unprepared” to defend Dunn.75 Thomas’s lack of prepa-
ration and experience was obvious, starting with his agreement to waive both 
Dunn’s presence during jury selection and the transcription of those proceed-
ings.76 His struggles continued throughout the retrial, most notably in his fail-
ure to challenge the State’s witnesses with evidence of their prior inconsistent 
statements and in his botched efforts to present Dunn’s alibi defense. 77 
At the retrial, eyewitnesses Susan Kelly and Beverly Monks made sub-
stantial changes to their testimony that went unchallenged by Thomas.78 Susan 
Kelly—the passer-by who could not identify Dunn in the police lineup—
pointed at him in court (“The Black man in the suit with the tie”) and told the 
jury that Dunn “resembles the man that I saw” on the morning of the attack.79 
On cross-examination, Thomas’s attempt to challenge Kelly regarding her pre-
vious failure to “positively identify anyone as the person who [she] saw pass-
ing on the street” only allowed Kelly to hedge her early testimony as being 
                                                                                                                           
photo spread, based on the eyewitness’ previous description of the perpetrator, or based on other fac-
tors that would draw attention to the suspect.” Id. 
 70 First Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 959; Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 19. 
 71 Defendant’s Motion to Continue, People v. Dunn, (Ill. Crim. Ct.) (No. 79-CR-4915) (on file 
with author). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 12.  
 74 Affidavit of Barry A. Spector, People v. Dunn, (Ill. Crim. Ct.) (No. 79-CR-4915) (on file with 
author). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 9. 
 77 See id. at 48–49, 79–86, 90–92, 105–06, 116–17, 147–48, 238–39. Under Illinois law, the prior 
inconsistent statements would have been admissible both to impeach the credibility of the testifying 
witnesses and for their truth as the statements were made under oath at a prior proceeding and were 
subject to cross-examination. See, e.g., People v. Donegan, 974 N.E.2d 352, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
Thomas’s failure to sequester witnesses corroborating Dunn’s alibi created a presentation of Dunn’s 
alibi that was weak and easily attacked by the prosecutor. See Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, 
at 197–98, 238.  
 78 Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 48–49, 105–06.  
 79 Id. at 48–49. 
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“[n]ot completely” able to identify someone.80 Beverly Monks—the neighbor 
who could not identify Dunn in the police lineup—testified at the first trial that 
the man she saw from her bedroom window was “five foot seven, maybe 
eight,” and “about maybe eighteen, twenty, twenty-two, twenty-three, some-
thing like that.”81 Monks agreed that she told the police that the episode oc-
curred between 8:35 AM and 8:45 AM.82 At the retrial, Monks’s estimate shift-
ed to “[a]pproximately after 8:00 o’clock [AM]” and her description of the 
suspicious man became clearer.83 Again, Thomas did not confront Monks with 
her prior testimony.84 The new time estimate added a critical piece to the 
State’s case: the construction of a logical, cogent timeline for the attacker to 
commit the assault and then escape on foot.85 
Diane Tribble, the officer who interviewed Dourdy at the hospital just 
hours after the attack, also changed her testimony without facing any challenge 
from Thomas.86 When first asked whether she could provide “any descriptions 
at all about any features of [her attacker’s] face,” Tribble responded in the neg-
ative.87 Tribble conceded that her report of the incident included Dourdy’s 
statement that she “never saw [the attacker] as he held her from behind.”88 At 
the retrial, Tribble equivocated, claiming she had “worded [her report] badly” 
and that she intended to write that Dourdy’s attacker “came up behind her and 
she didn’t see him as he was holding her . . . .”89 Remarkably, Thomas did not 
question Tribble about Dourdy’s inability to describe her attacker’s facial fea-
tures.90 
Thomas also failed to challenge the police crime scene investigator, Vic 
Tosello, on the significant changes he made to his testimony at the retrial.91 
Tosello testified at the first trial that the attacker’s purported escape route re-
quired him to “vault[]” over two chain-link fences that separated residential 
properties from railroad tracks.92 Tosello testified that he attempted to recreate 
the route by climbing over the fences and negotiating two steep embankments 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. at 51; Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 71. 
 81 First Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 607. 
 82 Id. at 631. 
 83 Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 101–02, 106. 
 84 Id. at 105–06. Worse yet, Thomas allowed Monks to reassert that the episode took place 
“[a]pproximately after 8:00 [AM].” Id. at 106. 
 85 See id. at 106. 
 86 See id. at 147–48. 
 87 Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 117 (responding in the negative to the question 
posed by the attorney). 
 88 First Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 844. 
 89 Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 147–48. 
 90 Id. at 141–53, 160–63. 
 91 Id. at 116–17. 
 92 First Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 690–91. 
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on either side of the railroad tracks.93 He acknowledged that portions of the 
fence were covered in thick brush and he had to search for a “clear spot” to 
attempt his maneuver.94 At the retrial, Tosello made no mention of the dense 
brush; instead, Tosello testified that the alleged escape route was based on 
Monks’s observations, which led him behind her home and to the railroad 
tracks.95 On cross-examination, Tosello stated that the only obstacle between 
Monks’s home and the railroad tracks was a fence that Tosello estimated to be 
forty-two inches high.96 Thomas asked Tosello if it was possible, once someone 
was on the railroad bed, to “walk right straight on 93rd street” then “walk right 
straight to 94th Street,” the street on which Dunn’s in-laws lived.97 Tosello 
agreed with the mischaracterization.98 In effect, the jury was left with a portrait 
of the attacker running, unencumbered, from the scene of the assault into the 
backyard of Dunn’s in-laws.99 
In addition, Dourdy’s confidence in her identification of Dunn increased 
significantly at the retrial.100 Due to the absence of any physical evidence of-
fered at either of the trials, the prosecutor’s case turned on Dourdy’s impas-
sioned in-court identification of Dunn.101 At a pretrial hearing, Dourdy 
acknowledged that in the hours after the attack she was unable to provide a 
“facial description” of her attacker to police.102 Over a year later at the retrial, 
Dourdy pointed directly to Dunn in the courtroom and exclaimed to the jury 
that she would “never forget [Dunn’s] face.”103 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. at 693–95, 698–99.  
 94 Id. at 697–98. 
 95 See Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 110–11. On cross-examination, Thomas asked 
Tosello whether he indicated in his report that he was “unable to get from the railroad tracks to the 
fence because of heavy shrubbery.” Id. at 119. Tosello stated that he did not indicate this, and Thomas 
did not pursue the issue. Id. 
 96 Id. at 116. 
 97 Id. at 117. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. Tosello later investigated a 1981 rape-murder case in which another African-American 
teenager was charged as the perpetrator without any physical evidence. John Conroy, The Good Cop, 
CHI. READER, Jan. 4, 2007, http://perma.cc/U847-XEVN. Like Dunn, the teenager was identified by a 
single witness: the murder victim’s brother who had also been attacked. Id. The defendant was freed 
only after another Chicago Police Department detective came forward with evidence that a different 
person had committed the crime. Id. Though Tosello was never charged or disciplined, an ensuing 
investigation revealed that he and another officer concealed exculpatory evidence, including “[a] po-
lice crime lab report on [a pair of the victim’s] panty hose found at the scene that would’ve helped 
[the] defense . . . .” Id. 
 100 Compare Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 208 (Dourdy unable to provide a 
“facial description” of her attacker to police), with Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 67 
(Dourdy made courtroom identification stating she would “never forget his face”).  
 101 See Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 67. 
 102 Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript, supra note 25, at 208 (responding in the negative to the question 
posed by the attorney). 
 103 Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 67. 
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Dourdy’s testimony describing the attack shifted, too, in subtle but signif-
icant ways. At the first trial, Dourdy testified that she was grabbed from behind 
as she walked to the train, lifted off her feet, and dragged from the sidewalk 
into bushes.104 She fell down and landed side-by-side with her attacker for 
“about maybe five seconds.”105 Her attacker then began choking Dourdy from 
behind, with his “full weight” on her back.106 Dourdy described an attempt to 
free herself before her attacker took her face and “smashe[d] it into the ground 
. . . .”107 He then pulled Dourdy’s shirt over her face, undid her pants, and sex-
ually assaulted her.108 Once the assault was over, the attacker pushed Dourdy 
away.109 She “looked around to see what he was doing . . . and he looked right 
at [her].”110 Then Dourdy “just started to run . . . .”111 At the retrial, Dourdy 
highlighted her opportunities to see the man who raped her.112 This time, she 
asserted that her attacker landed “[r]ight next” to her after the two fell and 
looked directly at her, shouting, “don’t look at me, white bitch.”113 When asked 
if Dourdy could see her attacker, she answered, “I looked right at his face.”114 
Dourdy identified Dunn in court as “the man over there with the blue suit and 
the yellow shirt and the Black face.”115 
In a misguided cross-examination, Thomas tried unsuccessfully to clarify 
Dourdy’s vantage point during the attack.116 Unlike her testimony at the first 
trial, Dourdy testified that her attacker was “on top” of her and that they were 
“rolling and laying on the side.”117 She also told the jury, “his face was stuck 
in mine.”118 Thomas never questioned Dourdy about her inability to offer a 
description of her attacker’s face to the police after the assault or her marked 
testimonial shifts from the first trial. Instead, his questions offered her a blank 
canvas to remake the attacker in Dunn’s likeness.119 Dourdy told Thomas that 
her attacker “[looked] just like an evil animal . . . [i]t was an evil face.”120 On 
redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Dourdy if she saw “that same per-
                                                                                                                           
 104 First Trial Transcript, supra note 56, at 505, 523. 
 105 Id. at 507, 524.  
 106 Id. at 508, 525. 
 107 Id. at 508–09. 
 108 Id. at 509–10. 
 109 Id. at 510. 
 110 Id. at 511. 
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 112 See Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 59–61.  
 113 Id. at 59, 61. 
 114 Id. at 61. 
 115 Id. at 60. 
 116 Id. at 79–86, 90–92.  
 117 Id. at 85. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. at 92. 
 120 Id. at 93. 
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son with that evil, ugly face in court, today.”121 Motioning towards Dunn, she 
replied, “I certainly do.”122 
After Dourdy’s damning in-court identification, Thomas committed criti-
cal errors in orchestrating Dunn’s alibi defense. After calling three witnesses 
who saw Dunn in Harvey on the morning of the attack, Thomas rested his de-
fense.123 Moments later, he backpedaled and asked the judge to allow Dunn—
who had been sitting in the courtroom throughout the trial—to testify.124 
Though the judge granted the request, Dunn’s subsequent testimony seemed 
less an independent account of his morning in Harvey than a parroting of the 
testimony of other alibi witnesses. Finally, Thomas called Willa Dunn to con-
firm that her husband had returned to Harvey on the night before the attack.125 
Again, as a consequence of his ad hoc approach, Thomas failed to instruct Wil-
la to remain outside of the courtroom while the other defense witnesses testi-
fied. The judge permitted Willa’s testimony, but the prosecutor easily attacked 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Id. at 94. 
 122 Id. In retrospect, Dourdy’s steadfast testimony is unsurprising. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 63–65 (2011). So-called 
“false confidence” misidentifications are often rooted in a witness’s first look at the accused in a 
flawed police lineup. Id. at 63–64. Victims who cannot effectively describe their attacker but then 
view a suggestive lineup often express complete, but erroneous, confidence in their subsequent identi-
fication. See id. (reporting on victims in three different DNA exoneration cases, one who testified that 
“there [was] absolutely no question in [her] mind” that the defendant attacked her, another who testi-
fied she “will never forget,” the defendant’s face, and a third who testified that she was “one hundred 
and twenty percent sure” that the defendant was the culprit, all of whom were mistaken). Importantly, 
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(2007), available at https://public.psych.iastate.edu/glwells/The_Justice%20Project_Eyewitness_
Identification_%20A_Policy_Review.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/2SML-WNFR?type=pdf. 
While a witness’s certainty or confidence in an identification “is one of the most powerful factors judges 
and juries consider when assessing eyewitness accuracy, a witness’s high level of confidence in an identi-
fication does not necessarily mean that the identification is more accurate.” Id. at 9. The opposite is often 
true. Id. More broadly, eyewitness misidentification is widely recognized as the leading cause of wrong-
ful conviction in the United States, “accounting for more wrongful convictions than all other causes 
combined”. Justice Project, supra, at 2 (citing Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 
1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005)). In a study of 200 cases in which 
individuals were exonerated based on DNA evidence, almost three-quarters involved one or more eye-
witness misidentifications at trial. Justice Project, supra, at 19. Cross-racial misidentifications are preva-
lent in this group. Innocence Project, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Reevaluating Lineups: Why 
Witnesses Make Mistakes and How to Reduce the Chance of a Misidentification 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-events-exonerations/reevaluating-lineups-why-witnesses-
make-mistakes-and-how-to-reduce-the-chance-of-a-misidentification. Of the DNA-related exonera-
tions in which eyewitness misidentifications played a critical role, over half were cross-racial misiden-
tifications. Id. Finally, victims of assault—especially rape—are particularly susceptible to misidentifi-
cation. GARRETT, supra, at 50–51 (noting that in a study of 190 DNA-related exonerations involving 
eyewitness misidentifications, seventy-three percent of the witnesses involved were victims, typically 
victims of rape). 
 123 See Second Trial Transcript, supra note 22, at 197. 
 124 Id. at 197–98.  
 125 Id. at 236–37. 
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her credibility, suggesting that her testimony, too, was shaped to conform to 
the accounts of other alibi witnesses.126 
At the conclusion of the trial, the prosecutor seized on several portions of 
the markedly different, but unchallenged, testimony as fundamental to his case. 
Susan Kelly, he told the jury during his closing argument, “saw a black man 
that resembled the defendant . . .” at approximately 7:30 AM near the scene of 
the rape.127 Beverly Monks then observed a suspicious-looking man running 
past her window at around 8:00 AM.128 Vic Tosello, the officer who investigat-
ed the attacker’s alleged escape route, discovered that Dunn’s in-laws lived 
“directly across the railroad tracks after a few low embankments and a fence 
. . . .”129 The only logical conclusion, the prosecutor argued, was that after the 
rape, Dunn “ran as fast as he could to . . . his father-in-law’s house . . . .”130 
Once there, “he could explain away everything” by telling his in-laws that “it 
[was] raining outside and [he] slipped while [he] was jogging . . . .”131 In addi-
tion, the prosecutor reminded the jury of Dourdy’s pledge that “she would nev-
er forget [Dunn’s] face as long as she lives . . . .”132 “[S]he said believe me I’m 
not making a mistake,” the prosecutor told the jury, before imploring them to 
“[p]lease believe her.”133 
At the end of the two-day retrial, Dunn was convicted of rape and aggra-
vated battery.134 He received a forty-year sentence of imprisonment, serving 
twenty-two years before his release on parole in 2002.135 Dunn completed his 
full sentence on July 2, 2008.136 In addition, as a consequence of his convic-
tion, Dunn is a registered sex offender.137 
In November 2013, the John Marshall Law School (“JMLS”) Pro Bono 
Clinic began an investigation into Dunn’s case in an effort to discover new ev-
idence of innocence. The investigation focused on Vernon Watson, an Illinois 
inmate serving a life sentence of imprisonment for a series of rapes that bear 
chilling similarities to Dourdy’s attack. Watson’s first rape occurred in October 
1980 in Beverly, the neighborhood where Dourdy was assaulted.138 The victim 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. at 238. 
 127 Id. at 261. 
 128 Id. at 261–62. 
 129 Id. at 262–63. 
 130 Id. at 291. 
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 132 Id. at 258.  
 133 Id. at 293–94.  
 134 Id. at 321. 
 135 Telephone Interview with Maurice Dunn, Ill. Dep’t of Corrs. (Aug. 13, 2014). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Maurice Dunn Registered Sex Offender, HOMEFACTS, http://perma.cc/9SZC-JDXQ (last visit-
ed Feb. 11, 2015). 
 138 People v. Watson, 789 N.E.2d 375, 383 (Ill. App. 2003). 
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saw Watson jogging as she walked to work.139 As she passed by, Watson 
grabbed her by the throat, pulled her into woods, and sexually assaulted her.140 
A jury convicted Watson for the assault, and he served nine years in prison, 
from 1980 through 1989.141 
Just three weeks after his release from prison, Watson again committed a 
rape in May 1989.142 This time, the victim was grabbed from behind at around 
7:20 AM while walking to the train station near the same Beverly neighbor-
hood.143 Watson pushed her into the woods, pulled her sweater over her face, 
and assaulted her.144 The victim later told police that her attacker was “black, 
between twenty and thirty years old, and approximately 5’7”, and 140 
[pounds].”145 When she was brought in for the lineup, she told police that “[her 
attacker] was 32, stood 5’8’’ tall, and weighed 143 [pounds].”146 
Watson’s final assault took place a few months later, also in Beverly.147 
The victim was en route to the train station shortly after 6:00 AM.148 Watson 
approached her, grabbed the front of her raincoat, and told her “if she 
screamed, he would kill her.”149 He then dragged her into an alley and told her 
to remove her clothing.150 At that point, the victim wrestled free and escaped to 
a nearby home.151 She later identified Watson in a lineup.152 Evidence of this 
assault was admitted  to show identity during Watson’s trial for the May 1989 
rape.153 Watson was convicted of the May 1989 rape and sentenced to life in 
prison.154 
In December 2013, JMLS lawyers interviewed Watson about Dourdy’s 
rape.155 Watson had never before been formally questioned about his involve-
ment in the assault. During the interview, Watson admitted that he “probably” 
raped Dourdy.156 He acknowledged that he committed a series of sexual as-
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saults that were similar in nature to Dourdy’s assault.157 Those similarities, ac-
cording to Watson, included his method of attacking his female victims from 
behind as they walked to commuter train stations near the site of Dourdy’s at-
tack.158 Moreover, he said that he wore “‘jogging’-type clothing” for the at-
tacks.159 Lastly, Watson stated that he lived on Chicago’s Southside, “was 
around the Beverly neighborhood ‘a lot,’” and was not incarcerated in July 
1979.160 Though Watson volunteered that he “did a lot of wrong,” he claimed 
his memory of specific crimes was marred by his abuse of hallucinogenic 
drugs in the late 1970s.161 
In addition to Watson’s near confession, the JMLS investigation uncov-
ered additional evidence undermining the integrity of the verdict against Dunn, 
including a ledger reflecting that a rape test kit administered on Dourdy by 
hospital personnel and subsequently turned over to the police had mysteriously 
disappeared on May 14, 1980, just two days before Dunn’s first trial.162 The 
investigation also confirmed that Dourdy’s pants—though still in existence—
had been poorly preserved after the assault and handled by jurors during both 
trials, leaving them severely compromised for DNA testing. 
Throughout his incarceration and while on parole, Dunn attempted to 
build a case for his innocence—including successfully moving, in a petition 
filed pro se, for DNA testing of Dourdy’s clothing.163 During much of this pro-
cess, he toiled without the active participation of counsel or investigative re-
sources.164 Though Dunn long suspected based on his own research in prison 
that Vernon Watson might be the true culprit, he could not interview Watson 
                                                                                                                           
 157 Id. The State of Illinois has also acknowledged the similarities between Watson’s prior rapes 
and the one for which Dunn was convicted. Maurice Dunn’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Ex-
hibit 9, Transcript of Status Conference, at 6, 8, People v. Dunn, 713 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) 
(No. 79-CR-4915) (Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Maurice Dunn’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief]. 
Specifically, at a February 29, 2012, hearing on the existence of testable DNA in Dunn’s case, Jeanne 
Bischoff, a former Cook County prosecutor, represented to a Cook County Circuit Court judge that 
she “gathered the files on Mr. Watson” and “intend[ed] to look into Mr. Watson just to do an investi-
gation . . . .” Id. at 6. Bischoff noted “that Mr. Watson was committing rapes in the Beverly area at or 
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 162 Evidence Ledger, People v. Dunn, (Ill. Crim. Ct.) (No. 79-CR-4915) (on file with author). 
 163 Id.; Maurice Dunn’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, supra note 157, at 12. 
 164 Maurice Dunn’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, supra note 157, at 12. Indeed, Dunn’s 
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to compel the State of Illinois to conduct DNA testing on Dourdy’s clothing. People v. Dunn, 713 
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2015] Illinois Post-Conviction Act Allows Claims of Actual Innocence 17 
without legal assistance.165 Even when Dunn was represented by counsel, the 
proceedings in his case were beset by delays, continuances, and filing exten-
sions brought both by his various lawyers and the State’s Attorney’s Office.166 
A review of the Cook County Circuit Court records reveals over seventy-five 
continuances in Dunn’s case between the inception of his post-conviction pro-
ceedings in 1989 and his eventual release from custody.167 In the same vein, 
Dunn’s first pro se petition for post-conviction relief languished in Cook Coun-
ty Circuit Court for seven years before its eventual dismissal.168 Appellate re-
view consumed another three years.169 
In 2014, JMLS lawyers filed a post-conviction petition on Dunn’s behalf, 
bringing forth the newly discovered evidence.170 The State of Illinois respond-
ed, claiming that Dunn’s successful completion of his sentence of imprison-
ment effectively terminated his rights under the Act.171 A close reading of the 
Act, however, suggests otherwise. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT 
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act was enacted in 1948 in response 
to a ruling by the United States Supreme Court that the state lacked an ade-
quate remedy for prisoners to contest denials of federal rights after trial or a 
guilty plea.172 The Act was originally designed to provide broad access to judi-
cial review of alleged constitutional violations, and the contemporary Act 
maintains this emphasis on access by establishing a very low threshold for pe-
titioners to meet to avoid dismissal of their claim.173 The Act further delineates 
a three-stage process for the adjudication of post-conviction petitions.174 
The U.S. Supreme Court case, Young v. Ragen, prompted Illinois to pass 
the Act.175 The Young court described a “recurring problem” arising from the 
absence of a “clearly defined method” by which Illinois petitioners could pur-
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sue post-conviction relief.176 In Young, the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary 
and larceny.177 He subsequently filed a state petition for habeas corpus relief 
that alleged “substantial” due process violations.”178 The trial court denied the 
petition without a hearing or consideration of its merits on the basis that habeas 
corpus was “not an appropriate remedy” for due process claims.179 On appeal, 
the Attorney General of Illinois conceded that the denial of consideration by 
the trial court “may be wrong,” but the question was one of state, not federal, 
procedure.180 The Supreme Court—while acknowledging that states may inde-
pendently establish and enforce remedial procedures—disagreed.181 Chief Jus-
tice Fred Vinson wrote that “it is not simply a question of state procedure when 
a state court of last resort closes the door to any consideration of a claim of 
denial of a federal right.”182 In Illinois, as in every other state, a petitioner rais-
ing due process or other federal claims must be afforded an opportunity to 
“submit proof of the truth of his allegations” in court.183 
In response to the Supreme Court’s directive, the Illinois General Assem-
bly enacted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.184 The Act in its original form 
was brief and broadly worded, consisting of seven sections consuming just 
“one and one half pages of text in the standard statutory textbooks.”185 The 
Act’s brevity and breadth was purposefully designed to cast a wide remedial 
net.186 The legislature intended that the Act would “fill the gaps” between ex-
isting remedies and provide access to the courts in cases “where direct review, 
habeas corpus and coram nobis were unavailable.”187 Contrary to the “rigid 
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 180 Id. at 238. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 239. 
 184 Correa, 485 N.E.2d at 308. 
 185 J. Patrick J. Quinn & J. John J. Hynes, Impact of Recent Decisions Upon Proceedings Under 
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 639, 639 (2003); see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
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 186 People v. Martin-Trigona, 489 N.E.2d 1356, 1359 (Ill. 1986); People v. Pier, 281 N.E.2d 289, 
290–91 (Ill. 1972); Stanley Levin, Post Conviction Remedies in Illinois, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
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 187 Martin-Trigona, 489 N.E.2d at 1359; see also People v. Loftus, 81 N.E.2d 495, 498 (Ill. 
1948). Coram nobis  
is an ancient [procedure], and was a process at common law used for the purpose of 
correcting errors of fact occurring in the trial court, which facts, if known to the court, 
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application” of those remedies, the Act embodied a flexible and inclusive pro-
cess designed to give convicted persons a chance to challenge the constitution-
al integrity of prior proceedings.188 In that spirit, Illinois courts have long held 
that the Act must be liberally construed to ensure a spacious path to relief.189 
The contemporary Act retains its historical emphasis on broad access to 
judicial review of asserted constitutional violations and provides a three-stage 
process for adjudicating post-conviction petitions.190 In stage one, a petitioner 
“need only present the gist of a constitutional claim” to survive dismissal by 
the trial court.191 The State may not respond at this juncture.192 If the court 
concludes that the petition does not satisfy the “low threshold” required to pro-
ceed to the next phase, it must provide written reasons for dismissing the peti-
tion as “frivolous or . . . patently without merit . . . .”193 An order of dismissal 
is appealable under a de novo review standard.194 At the second stage, the 
court may in its discretion appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner, and coun-
sel may amend the petition.195 In response, the state may answer the petition or 
file a motion to dismiss.196 If the court determines that the petition demon-
strates a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the process moves to 
the final stage: “an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition.”197 At the 
hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a violation of his or 
her constitutional rights.198 
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In contrast to the modest standard for measuring a constitutional claim at 
stage one, the Act imposes strictly enforced time limitations to file a petition at 
stage two.199 A petitioner has six months after the denial of a direct appeal to 
seek post-conviction relief.200 If a petitioner does not file a direct appeal, the 
post-conviction filing period ends three years from the date of the convic-
tion.201 In either case, the statute of limitations is inflexible unless a petitioner 
alleges facts proving “the delay was not due to his or her culpable negli-
gence.”202 
III. HOW DOES AN INNOCENT MAN GET NO RELIEF? 203—RAISING ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE CLAIMS UNDER THE ACT 
The initial version of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act did not allow post-
conviction petitioners to present a “free-standing” claim of innocence.204 Ra-
ther, the Act limited claims to collateral constitutional violations that occurred 
at trial or as part of a guilty plea, such as the ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.205 For the next half-century, the viability of successfully litigating an actual 
innocence claim within the Act’s constitutional parameters remained uncer-
tain.206 In 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court used the case of People v. Washing-
ton to clarify the question in powerful, if surprising, fashion and to allow post-
conviction petitioners to present “free-standing” claims of innocence.207 
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In Washington, a jury convicted Kurtis Washington of first-degree mur-
der, despite an alibi defense placing him elsewhere during the crime.208 Fol-
lowing the denial of his direct appeal, Washington filed a post-conviction peti-
tion.209 To support a claim that his counsel failed to properly investigate the 
case, Washington alleged that a recently discovered witness would implicate 
another culprit.210 After the witness testified at an in camera hearing, the trial 
court allowed Washington to amend his petition to include a claim founded 
exclusively upon the new evidence of his innocence.211 The court then granted 
the petition and ordered a new trial, holding that if the witness had credibly 
testified it would have “had some significant impact” on the jury.212 The appel-
late court affirmed the trial court’s decision on the same grounds.213 
In affirming the ruling, the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished post-
conviction claims of innocence derived from newly discovered evidence or 
“freestanding” claims from traditional post-conviction claims tied to constitu-
tional violations occurring during trial.214 The court reasoned that even if a 
claim of evidence is “freestanding,” it must still implicate “a federal or Illinois 
constitutional right” to seek relief under the Act because the Act “is limited to 
constitutional claims.”215 Washington argued that his claim of actual innocence 
triggered due process protections under the both the federal and Illinois consti-
tutions.216 
In its emphatic and far-reaching due process analysis, the Washington de-
cision established the unique station of “freestanding” innocence claims in 
post-conviction litigation and the critical need for judicial review of new evi-
dence of innocence.217 The court concluded that Herrera v. Collins, a “con-
flicted” United States Supreme Court decision, foreclosed relief under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.218 From there, the Washington 
court took a remarkable turn. Although acknowledging that the Illinois Due 
Process Clause mirrors its federal counterpart, the court rejected any “self-
imposed constraint” to rule “in ‘lockstep’” with Herrera.219 Instead, the court 
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relied on its own precedent to conclude that both procedural and substantive 
due process must be afforded to claims of innocence based on new evidence.220 
As a matter of procedural due process, “to ignore such a claim would be fun-
damentally unfair.”221 In addition, imprisonment of the innocent would be so 
“conscience shocking” as to implicate substantive due process.222 The court’s 
break from Herrera on substantive due process was particularly stark. In Her-
rera, the Court rebuffed the petitioner’s substantive due process argument, 
opining that a “substantive due process analysis would require the petitioner, in 
fact, to be innocent.”223 As the petitioner was convicted in an “otherwise con-
stitutionally proper trial,” he was not innocent.224 Writing for the majority in 
Washington, Justice Charles Freeman countered Herrera’s curt analysis: 
We think that the Court overlooked that a “truly persuasive demon-
stration of innocence” would, in hindsight, undermine the legal con-
struct precluding a substantive due process analysis. The stronger 
the claim—the more likely it is that a convicted person is actually 
innocent—the weaker is the legal construct dictating that the person 
be viewed as guilty. A “truly persuasive demonstration of inno-
cence” would effectively reduce the idea to legal fiction.225 
In a nod to—if not taking a subtle jab at—the Herrera court Judge Freeman 
concluded: “[w]e believe that no person convicted of a crime should be de-
prived of life or liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence.”226 
In the aftermath of the Washington decision, the Illinois General Assem-
bly took further measures to ensure that claims of actual innocence are not lost 
to procedural technicalities.227 In 2003, in the wake of ongoing revelations 
about the wrongful convictions of several Illinois death row inmates, the Gen-
eral Assembly amended the Act to allow a post-conviction petitioner to raise a 
claim of actual innocence unencumbered by any statute of limitations.228 Dur-
ing debate on the amendment, the bill’s sponsor, Senator John Cullerton, said 
that the change would “allow someone who has new evidence and can prove 
actual innocence to have that right in a post-trial conviction.”229 In a subse-
quent push for the amendment’s passage, Cullerton described a need for “revo-
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 227 See 2003 Ill. Laws 4304. 
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lutionary change” because “we don’t want to have happen [again] what hap-
pened in [Illinois] where we had thirteen, and maybe even seventeen, people 
who were exonerated for not committing the crime . . . .”230 Ultimately, the 
amendment passed with no express restrictions on the individuals eligible to 
raise claims of actual innocence.231 To the contrary, the amended language re-
flects the General Assembly’s intent to eliminate procedural barriers for inno-
cence claims and minimize the risk of future wrongful convictions.232 
IV. A “QUESTION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE” 233—ACTUAL INNOCENCE 
CLAIMS AND THE “IMPRISONMENT” REQUIREMENT 
Under the Act’s plain language, “[a]ny person imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary” may pursue post-conviction relief.234 Emphasis on the Act’s elastic con-
struction has resulted in an evolving and non-literal interpretation of “[a]ny 
person imprisoned in the penitentiary.” 235 Over time, the phrase has expanded 
to accommodate petitioners who are on bond pending appeal,236 under manda-
tory supervised release,237 on probation,238 released on parole,239 serving con-
secutive sentences,240 or who were released from custody with a petition pend-
ing.241 The Act’s protections are also available to petitioners convicted of mis-
demeanors, in addition to felonies.242  
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the language “im-
prisoned in the penitentiary” to bar from the Act a petitioner who is no longer 
                                                                                                                           
 230 Id. at 52, 54. The Northwestern University Law School Center on Wrongful Convictions lists 
167 total exonerations in Illinois. Bluhm Legal Clinic, Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, All Illinois Ex-
onerations, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/
wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/il/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). 
 231 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(c) (2012). 
 232 See id.; see, e.g., Senate Transcript of the Debate on S.B. 472, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 
at 44 (Ill. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cullerton) [hereinafter Senate Transcript 2] (“In the case 
of post-conviction petitions, after a person’s been convicted, if they believe that they’ve got newly 
discovered evidence that shows a substantial basis the defendant might actually be innocent, they 
would [through the Act] have an opportunity to present that [evidence] . . . .”). 
 233 See People v. Dale, 92 N.E.2d 761, 765 (Ill. 1950) (opining that “[t]he question of guilt or 
innocence of the petitioner will not be before the court on the post-conviction proceeding . . . .”) (em-
phasis added). 
 234 § 122-1(a). 
 235 Id.; People v. Pack, 862 N.E.2d 938, 943 (Ill. 2007); People v. Martin-Trigona, 489 N.E.2d 
1356, 1359 (Ill. 1986); People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 309 (Ill. 1985); People v. Davis (Davis I), 
235 N.E.2d 634, 636 (Ill. 1968); People v. Montes, 412 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Peo-
ple v. Placek, 357 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).  
 236 Martin-Trigona, 489 N.E.2d at 1359. 
 237 Correa, 485 N.E.2d at 309. 
 238 Montes, 412 N.E.2d at 1364. 
 239 Placek, 357 N.E.2d at 662. 
 240 Pack, 862 N.E.2d at 943. 
 241 Davis I, 235 N.E.2d at 636. 
 242 People v. Warr, 298 N.E.2d. 164,167 (Ill. 1973). 
24 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:1 
subject to liberty restrictions.243 The origin of the exclusion predates both 
Washington and the 2003 “actual innocence” amendment. In 1949, the Cook 
County State’s Attorney in People v. Dale filed a motion to dismiss a post-
conviction petition on the basis that the Act violated Article III of the Illinois 
Constitution.244 Because the Act provided an avenue “for rehearings and retri-
als on constitutional issues in causes finally adjudicated,” the State’s Attorney 
argued that it encroached on the exclusive purview of the judiciary.245 Reject-
ing the challenge, the Illinois Supreme Court highlighted that “[t]he question 
of guilt or innocence of the petitioner will not be before the court on the post-
conviction proceeding . . . .”246 Rather, an “inquiry” under the Act “will be lim-
ited to constitutional issues not previously adjudicated.”247 The court conclud-
ed that it did not disrupt the constitutional balance between the legislature and 
the judiciary because the Act offered no means of refuting or disputing the 
original findings and judgment.248 
In Dale, the State’s Attorney argued against the Act’s constitutionality on 
the ground that it unreasonably foreclosed from access certain “classes of per-
sons imprisoned in jails, reformatories and similar institutions . . . .”249 The 
claim alleged that the Act’s inclusion of the word “penitentiary” could, theoret-
ically, exclude from relief “one convicted of murder who is awaiting execution 
in the Cook County jail.”250 The court again disagreed.251 The legislature, it 
reasoned, rightly intended to “draw a distinction [in the Act] between convic-
tions for minor offenses and those for serious crimes,” as well as between per-
sons “actually being deprived of their liberty” and those who have “served 
their sentences and who might wish to purge their records of past convic-
tions.”252 On the other hand, the word “penitentiary” was “generic” and not 
intended to exclude other forms of confinement.253 
In limiting the Act’s reach to persons “deprived of their liberty,” the Dale 
court did not envision a challenge to a conviction based on a freestanding actu-
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al innocence claim.254 Indeed, the crux of the court’s logic in declaring the Act 
constitutional was the Act’s preclusion of “question[s] of guilt or inno-
cence.”255 Consequently, the Dale court implicitly confined its standing limita-
tion to non-imprisoned petitioners who attempt to wage a collateral constitu-
tional attack on a prior conviction.256 Post-Dale cases that rejected a non-
imprisoned petitioner’s efforts at “purging his record” support this reading.257 
For instance, in People v. Carrera, Jesus Carrera pleaded guilty to a drug of-
fense and received a probationary sentence.258 Months after he completed the 
sentence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted deportation 
proceedings.259 Carrera filed a post-conviction petition, arguing that his trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him of the poten-
tial immigration consequences of the conviction.260 Relying on Dale, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court held that Carrera lacked standing under the Act for the 
purpose of “purg[ing] his record” to avoid deportation.261 
Similarly, in People v. West, Thomas Paul West was denied post-
conviction relief because he had completed his sentence.262 West was convicted 
of manslaughter in 1981 and successfully completed a four-year prison sen-
tence.263 In 1988, West was convicted of murder in Arizona and sentenced to 
death.264 In reaching the sentence, the court considered West’s prior man-
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slaughter conviction as an aggravating factor.265 West then filed a post-
conviction petition in Illinois claiming several collateral constitutional viola-
tions at the manslaughter trial.266 As West had completed his Illinois sentence 
four years earlier, the court rejected his attempts to void the prior conviction 
and sidestep the consequences of the Arizona crime.267  
More recently, in People v. Henderson, the Illinois appellate court denied 
Donte Henderson post-conviction relief because he had completed his sen-
tence.268 Henderson pleaded guilty to possession and distribution of a con-
trolled substance and battery of a correctional officer.269 Following the comple-
tion of his sentence, Henderson filed a post-conviction petition contending that 
his guilty pleas were entered involuntarily because he was not admitted to a 
“boot camp” program “as allegedly promised.”270 The court dismissed the peti-
tion, opining that relief is unavailable under the Act for petitioners who “have 
completely served their sentences and merely wish to purge their criminal rec-
ords of past convictions.”271 
V. READING THE ACT TO ALLOW ANY PERSON CONVICTED OF A  
CRIME TO RAISE A CLAIM OF INNOCENCE 
Petitioners who have completed a custodial sentence but raise freestand-
ing claims of actual innocence fall outside of Dale’s narrow standing re-
striction.272 Such petitioners, however, are not without legal cover. To the con-
trary, recent case law, the due process rationale espoused by the court in Wash-
ington, and recent Illinois legislation all support a broader application of the 
Act to include petitioners who have completed their sentences.273 
A line of post-Dale cases endorses the notion that the Act should not be 
“construed so narrowly” to bar petitioners in “every case” in which a petition 
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is filed after a sentence ends.274 In People v. Davis and its progeny, the Illinois 
Supreme Court interpreted the Act as an instrument chiefly designed to chal-
lenge the “stigma and disabilities” of an unjust conviction, irrespective of any 
restraints on liberty.275 In People v. Lynn, the court held that a challenge to “the 
validity of [a] conviction” is not rendered moot simply because the petitioner’s 
underlying sentence is complete.276 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas 
Moran opined, the “nullification of a conviction may have important conse-
quences to a defendant.”277 Unlike a challenge to the sentence itself, a petition 
attacking a conviction does not involve a “mere abstract proposition . . . .”278 
Conversely, the deleterious effects of a criminal conviction are tangible and 
enduring.279 The logic of Davis and Lynn is especially compelling with respect 
to claims of actual innocence. Certainly, the catharsis of exoneration is of far 
greater consequence than “nullification of a conviction” on any other basis.280 
Further, the “stigma and disabilities” adjoining a criminal conviction, especial-
ly acute and lasting for registered sex offenders, all but vanish upon a determi-
nation of innocence.281 
Moreover, interpreting the Act to allow any petitioner to advance a claim 
of actual innocence is consistent with the due process analysis of the Washing-
ton court.282 In decisively breaking from federal precedent, Washington estab-
lished that claims of actual innocence strike at the heart of both procedural and 
substantive due process concerns.283 The Washington court’s procedural due 
process rationale applies with equal—if not greater—force to petitioners who 
suffer in prison for the entirety of a sentence without ready access to counsel or 
investigative tools.284 Only upon their release do such petitioners have any real 
opportunity to discover new, non-cumulative, “material” and “conclusive” evi-
dence of innocence.285 Further, many petitioners endure interminable delays in 
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the post-conviction process like those experienced by Maurice Dunn. A peti-
tioner, though, should not be penalized for long delays that characterize the 
post-conviction process over which he or she has no control.286 In this light, to 
prevent a petitioner from pursuing post-conviction relief due to the completion 
of a sentence would “frustrate justice.”287 
In addition, Washington’s substantive due process language has applica-
tion to all post-conviction innocence claims, regardless of the custodial status 
of the petitioner.288 As the court reasoned, “the stronger the claim” of inno-
cence advanced in a post-conviction petition, the less valid a guilty verdict in 
an otherwise “constitutionally fair trial.”289 For example, in Maurice Dunn’s 
case, the balance tilts strongly in favor of innocence. The prosecutor at the re-
trial offered no physical evidence linking Dunn to the crime, relying instead on 
eyewitness testimony.290 The testimony of those witnesses was suspect, but 
went largely unchallenged.291 Finally, Constance Dourdy’s in-court identifica-
tion of Dunn—the prosecutor’s most compelling evidence—was compromised 
by a suggestive police lineup.292 In stark contrast, Dunn’s newly discovered 
evidence is compelling, including the tacit confession of a rapist who commit-
ted three assaults almost identical to the one for which Dunn was convicted.293 
In essence, Dunn spent over two decades in prison based on a trial and verdict 
that was nothing more than a “legal fiction.”294 Therefore, Dunn’s “conscience 
shocking” imprisonment entitles him to substantive due process protection.295 
Further, by eliminating the statute of limitations for innocence claims, the 
Illinois General Assembly categorically expressed that procedural hurdles 
should not obstruct access to post-conviction relief for any wrongfully con-
victed person.296 The legislature’s intent to ensure unfettered access to post-
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conviction judicial review of innocence claims is made even clearer when the 
Act is read in tandem with a subsequent related law: the Illinois Certificate of 
Innocence (“COI”) statute.297 Enacted in 2009, the COI law is designed to a 
streamline the process for exonerated individuals to seek reparations for a con-
viction that is later reversed, dismissed, or set aside.298 Before the law passed, 
a gubernatorial pardon—often years in the making—provided the only basis 
for a formal declaration of innocence.299 
A close reading of the COI law reveals a presumption that procedural 
means of advancing innocence claims exist.300 In its introduction, the law states 
firmly that “persons who have been wrongly convicted of crimes in Illinois 
and subsequently imprisoned . . . should have an available avenue to obtain a 
finding of innocence so that they may obtain relief . . . .”301 While “relief” en-
compasses legal redress “through a petition in the Court of Claims,” the COI 
law presupposes the existence of a procedural mechanism to advance inno-
cence claims.302 In other words, to successfully obtain a certificate of inno-
cence, a petitioner must establish that a conviction “was reversed or vacated, 
and the indictment or information dismissed . . . .”303 For Maurice Dunn and 
similarly situated litigants, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides the only 
viable judicial process to pursue this end. 
The legislative intent behind the COI law provides a further basis for ena-
bling petitioners who have completed their sentences to file for post-conviction 
relief. Advocating for the passage of the COI law, Representative Mary Flow-
ers discussed the disabilities that persist for the wrongfully convicted, even 
after their release from imprisonment.304 They are, she said, “technically . . . 
still incarcerated because their name is not cleared.”305 Indeed, wrongfully 
convicted individuals have stated that the persistent stigma of a wrongful con-
viction is an “awful nightmare of a cloud hanging over [them]” and a life-
destroying burden.306 With those sentiments in mind, the General Assembly 
endeavored to remove “a variety of substantive and technical obstacles” 
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thwarting the pursuit of innocence by the wrongfully convicted.307 In so doing, 
the COI law in the interest of justice gives “due consideration to difficulties of 
proof” caused by factors such as “the passage of time” and “the destruction of 
evidence” by government actors.308 To prevent a petitioner from access to post-
conviction relief merely because he or she has successfully completed a sen-
tence is the kind of “technical” roadblock to justice decried by the General As-
sembly in the COI statute.309 Instead, the “available avenue to obtain a finding 
of innocence” must extend through judicial review of all innocence claims 
brought under the Act, regardless of a petitioner’s custodial status.310 Other-
wise, the legislative promise of eventual justice for the wrongfully convicted 
rings hollow. 
In response to the continued national trend of exonerations311, other state 
legislatures have crafted post-conviction routes to actual innocence claims for 
individuals who have completed a custodial sentence.312 For instance, Utah 
allows for innocence claims by any “person who has been convicted of a felo-
ny offense . . . .”313 Like the Illinois evidentiary requirements for a claim of 
innocence, the Utah law focuses on “newly discovered material evidence” and 
“not merely cumulative” evidence.314 In similar fashion, Virginia recognizes a 
comparable post-conviction remedy for “a person who was convicted of a fel-
ony upon a plea of not guilty . . . .”315 The petition must include “evidence 
[that] was previously unknown or unavailable to the petitioner” and that is “not 
merely cumulative, corroborative or collateral.”316 In fact, several state statutes 
allow a post-conviction petitioner to raise any constitutional basis for relief, 
regardless of its nature, after a sentence has been fully completed.317 
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Along the same lines, American Bar Association (ABA) standards for 
post-conviction relief call for “comprehensive” and “sufficiently broad” reme-
dies that cover challenges to “the validity of judgments of conviction, or of the 
legality of custody or supervision based upon a judgment of conviction.”318 
Among the bases for challenging the validity of a criminal conviction is the 
discovery of “evidence of material facts which were not, and in the exercise of 
due diligence could not have been . . . presented and heard in the proceedings 
leading to conviction and sentence, and that now require vacation of the con-
viction or sentence . . . .”319 More critically, a custody requirement is not re-
quired under the standards.320 Rather, “[t]he right to seek relief from an invalid 
conviction and sentence ought to exist . . . even though the applicant has com-
pletely served the challenged sentence . . . .”321 In effect, the ABA standards 
establish parameters for post-conviction relief within which Maurice Dunn and 
comparably situated petitioners squarely stand. 
CONCLUSION 
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act was created to ensure that indi-
viduals convicted of a criminal offense are not victimized by “gaps” in the ap-
pellate process and left without recourse to challenge a conviction on constitu-
tional grounds.322 Since its passage, Illinois courts have interpreted the Act 
liberally and in keeping with its promise of open access to relief.323 In Wash-
ington, the Illinois Supreme Court established that “freestanding” claims of 
actual innocence are paramount in state post-conviction litigation and entitled 
to both procedural and substantive due process protections.324 The Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly, through its 2003 amendment opening the door for a claim of 
innocence raised at any time, echoed Washington’s endorsement and remained 
faithful to the Act’s core principles.325 
For petitioners like Maurice Dunn, access to the Act is imperative. A 
wave of DNA exonerations over the last quarter-century exposed fundamental 
flaws in the prosecution and defense of criminal cases. Categorical proof of 
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innocence through DNA in most cases, though, is a “television myth.”326 In 
reality, establishing innocence entails meticulous case reconstruction and pro-
duction of new evidence that would likely alter the outcome of a subsequent 
trial. The high bar for relief in Illinois is virtually impossible for any post-
conviction petitioner to reach, much less those who are incarcerated and lack 
legal counsel. Only upon the completion of a sentence do many petitioners 
have even a remote chance to prove their innocence. More critically, while re-
lease from custody eases physical restraints for the wrongfully convicted, true 
liberty depends upon exoneration. As a result, Illinois post-conviction petition-
ers who claim innocence should not be barred from meaningful judicial review 
based on a standing restriction of antiquated origins. Rather, in light of the 
Act’s roots in due process and the centrality of innocence claims to fundamen-
tal concepts of justice, any petitioner convicted of a crime must be entitled to 
its protections. 
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